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What would a feasible system of social security in Germany have looked like in
the year of 1995 and beyond? In order to find an answer we describe three base
systems: (l)a purely funded system of social security, (2) a fully mandatory
funded system of social security, and (3) a partially mandatory funded system. It
is argued that - neglecting problems of transition - a purely funded system would
be the best in economic terms; a fully mandatory funded system would need al-
most as many controls as the currently prevailing system (often labelled "pay-as-
you-go system"). A partially mandatory funded system, assuring some kind of
basic income, would need less controls and less governmental authority than the
fully mandatory system but more than a funded system.
After quantification of two scenarios which represent components of the three
base systems, a system of taxation with respect to contributions and/or benefits is
discussed which is at the same time simple in terms of costs of bureaucracy and
does not tax economic growth more than necessary.Contents
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1. The Setting
With a grain of salt the history of social security in Germany over the past 150
years can be summarised by saying that the half-life period of the laws on so-
cial security has been declining from some 75 years to today's 7 years.
1 In fact,
the rules of the old-age pension game seem to change on a daily basis at pres-
ent. This quite obviously is a somewhat odd situation: Providing for old age is a
process of saving over the first part of life and of consuming past savings and
interests on these savings in the second part of life. In other words: Old-age se-
curity is a very long-run phenomenon. On the other hand, politicians and the
people's representatives are focused mainly on short-run phenomena. Thus, an
economist would propose that politicians should not interfere regarding private
savings for old age. Indeed, it was argued by Buchanan in 1968 that the main
flaw in the US system of social security was that "political gimmickry can pro-
duce a collapse of the whole structure" (Buchanan 1968, p. 390).
It is always appropriate to introduce and define the subject that one is dealing
with. There are basically two approaches to old-age security, one is collectivis-
tic and the other one individualistic. What we observe today in most - if not all
- industrial countries is some kind of collectivistic social-security system.
These are systems where one group of people - the labour force - pays taxes or
social-security contributions in order to finance another group of people, i.e.
pensioners. This is quite different in an individualistic framework where any-
body who pays into the pension system does so for his own benefit; his contri-
butions bear his name tag. When the individual retires he will receive grosso
modo exactly what he had hitherto paid including the interests on his payments.
1 Cf. Glismann, Horn (1997) for the whole argument and a short historical overview of Ger-
man social security."Grosso modo" refers to the fact that there are taxes to be paid and that the in-
dividual has no certainty about his life span. It is the latter part of the indi-
vidualistic pension system, and that part only, which may be subject to insur-
ances.
In the following we shall call the individualistic type of social security a
"funded" system and the collectivistic variant an "unfunded" system.
2
It is often said that it would be useful to look across one's own borders at other
countries in order to see how the system of social security of any kind works
there. For example, with respect to transforming an unfunded system into a
funded system one should look at the example of Chile; Chile was one of those
countries that did perform such a transformation. It has to be borne in mind,
however, that international comparisons are in many an instance of a limited
usefulness: Countries are different with respect to size (this concerns for ex-
ample the impact of such a transformation on interest rates, national interest
rates as well as those prevailing on the world capital market), they are different
with respect to income levels (whether the average income of labour is about
2 000 $ per year or 20 000 $ affects expectations as much as savings ratios),
and they are different with respect to attitudes (the degree to which the indi-
viduals have faith in the seriousness of government and private institutions; ex-
pectations regarding the rate of inflation and future economic growth may differ
just like the relative preference for work and leisure). Not least, there are major
differences with regard to the unfunded systems prevailing in the countries
2 It should be mentioned that the funded system treats the accumulated savings plus interest
payments just like any other property of a person, which means that in the case of death the
full amount of capital goes (after deduction of inheritance taxes) to the legal heirs. Also, it is
entirely in the hands of the individual whether he wants to work and save until his death or
whether he will retire, say, after 30 years of work. Needless to say that the funded system
can be interpreted as an ideal - i.e. pareto-optimal - system because the individual preferen-
ces of contributors will be recognised.which are compared. Thus, it is hard to see how one country's transformation
performance can be taken as a model of what might happen in another country.
Quite a different matter is the use of international comparisons in order to arrive
at what has been called a "normal pattern". The normal pattern in this case
would be more like the average pattern of other countries regarding structural
changes in the system of social security. However, the systems of social secu-
rity vary considerably across countries regarding the relative importance of so-
cial security organised by governments, of corporate pension systems, and of
other privately organised provisions for the old age; in addition, the above
mentioned differences in the rate of contributions and, grosso modo, in the
overall savings ratios tend to make averages of the normal-pattern type quite
meaningless. What is more, the number of countries, industrialised or not, that
have effectually tried to change from an unfunded system to a funded system, is
too small to arrive at any meaningful normal or average pattern.
Nonetheless, the Chilean and the Australian cases are considered to be proto-
types for transforming unfunded into funded systems of social security. So what
can we learn from the transformation process in these countries?
2. Reforms of Social Security in Australia
Australia is currently in the early status of introducing a system of mandatory
contributions to private-pension funds (Edey, Simon 1996). For most of the
employees, the scheme will eventually replace, either fully or partially, the cur-
rent government social-security system. The mechanism for this replacement is
the application of existing means meant to result in a projected accumulation of
private-pension savings. The scheme has been implemented by building on the
existing financial infrastructure for voluntary retirement pension funds. None-
theless, a number of policy issues remain to be dealt with. Perhaps the most im-
portant is the impact of the system on retirement decisions. A number of fea-tures of the system effectively create incentives favouring early retirement and
continued reliance on the government pensions. Also important is the increasing
complexity of the system, a result of the combination of rule changes and
grandfathering (i.e. the honouring of claims accumulated under the old system)
of existing rights at each stage of the process.
The new system really began with the introduction of the SGC (Super-
Annuation Guarantee Chance) legislation in 1991. However, the introduction of
award super annuation in 1986 was an important precursor to this. In 1985, the
union movement argued for, and received, a commitment to establish a 3-per
cent employer-funded annuation benefit, in view of the similar general wage
raise. This was implemented by inserting a requirement into employment
awards that employers pay 3 per cent of wages into a nominated industry super-
annuation fund. Many different union-organised industry-super-annuation funds
were created to receive the contributions which are beginning to attain a signifi-
cant size. As awards were renegotiated, the coverage of super annuation was
increased to many more members of the workforce than had previously been
the case. Nonetheless, the coverage of this scheme was not universal and, due
to negotiation delays in some areas, not all union members receive the benefits
immediately.
In 1991, the government extended the coverage of super annuation to all em-
ployees by introducing the SGC legislation. The legislation mandated minimum
levels of super-annuation contributions by all employers on behalf of their em-
ployees. The levels were fixed at 5 per cent (at 3 per cent for employers with a
payroll of less than 500 000 A$) and were scheduled to rise until they reached 9
per cent in the 2000/2001 financial year. The government also reckons the pos-
sibility of raising contributions to 12 per cent through employee contributions at
some later date. The structure of the legislation was that employers were not
technically mandated to contribute to employee-super-annuation, but if they didnot, the government would impose a Super-Annuation-Guarantee Chance of an
equal amount through a tax system and then redistribute this to the employee.
The SGC tax payment would not be tax-deductible and would have an addi-
tional administration charge included. Thus, it would be cheaper for employers
to make the super-annuation contributions themselves. Participation is manda-
tory and employers are required to make contributions for all their employees,
subject to some exemptions for part-time and casual workers who do not gen-
erate sufficient balances. These exemptions are made in order to reduce admin-
istrative problems associated with contributions of very small amounts. In all
cases where people do not accumulate sufficient balances to fund their retire-
ment expenses, the tax-financed public age-pension will continue to act as a
safety net. Individuals may make additional voluntary contributions. These are
typically in the range of 2 per cent to 10 per cent of salary. However, the taxa-
tion treatment of additional contributions is different to employer-provided su-
per annuation as they have to be paid out of post-tax income. Contributions by
the self-employed are essentially voluntary. Up to the threshold amount they
can benefit from employer-treatment over contributions for tax purposes. They
can also qualify for the government co-contribution on any contributions as
employees in line with the schedule.
There are practically no restrictions on where funds can be invested. The only
significant one is that no more than 10 per cent of funds can be invested in the
business of the sponsoring employer. In the 1960s and 1970s rules existed
which required super-annuation funds to invest a minimum of 30 per cent of
their assets in government securities, but these rules are no longer in place.
Benefits must be "preserved", i.e. made unavailable to the beneficiary, until age
55, subject to exemptions in cases of hardship and some voluntary contributions
which can be withdrawn on change of employment. Traditionally, the most
common form of benefit has been a lump sum. More recent provisions areaimed at encouraging people to take an annuity. The type of annuity purchased
can be either a traditional annuity (which provides a given income for the rest
of a person's life) or an allocated pension. An allocated pension pays an annual
income based on investment earnings. The allocated pension is not guaranteed
to last for the retiree's lifetime. The difference between these two products is
that with an annuity the life insurance company bears the investment and mor-
tality risk, while with the allocated pension the retiree does. Thus, if a person
with an allocated pension dies relatively early, there may be a lump sum to be
distributed to their estate. If a super-annuation-fund member dies before pay
out, the accumulated contributions are paid to the estate and are tax-free, re-
gardless of the age of the beneficiary.
Mandated life insurance or disability provisions do not exist. However, many
funds offer these facilities, taking advantage of the fact that they can obtain
cheaper life insurance without the necessity of everyone having a medical (i.e.
pure life insurance) cover. Disability insurance is also offered by some on a
similar basis. This usually involves the employer paying an extra contribution
to cover the costs of the insurance. These policies can pay benefits as either
lump sums or annuities and the choice made will depend upon individual cir-
cumstances. Some schemes also provide annuities on retirement that will re-
ward to surviving spouses if the retiree dies relatively early, but this is not a
mandated requirement.
3. Reforms of Social Security in Chile
Chile has introduced a radical change towards an optional funded pension sys-
tem (Edwards 1997). "Optional" means that all persons concerned have the
choice to opt into a private-pension scheme or to rely on the still existing
scheme. The reform of Chile's social-security system replaces the pay-as-you-
go regime with a capitalisation system, based on individual retirement accountsmanaged by private companies known as "Administratores de Fondos de Pen-
siones", AFPs. Each AFP can manage only one retirement fund, and there is a
strict separation between the retirement fund and the management of the firms'
assets. Largely as a result of this one-fund-per-AFP rule and of a regulation that
establishes a minimum rate of return on the funds, there has been a very low
degree of actual portfolio diversification across AFPs.
The system is mandatory for individuals working for a formal employer (the
difference between the formal and the informal sector is in a sense a speciality
of Latin-American economies, which cannot be easily compared with condi-
tions in industrial countries; by a rough definition, employment in the informal
sector pertains to all kinds of occupations not covered by government regulation
and which are out of reach of taxman (the black or grey economy)). Individuals,
however, can freely decide which AFP will manage their retirement funds.
Moreover, individuals are free to transfer their funds freely among the different
management firms. When individuals retire they can choose to buy an annuity,
or to withdraw their funds according to a predetermined (actuarially fair) plan.
The system also has a survivors' term life insurance component, and a disability
program funded by an additional insurance premium. In the reform system, the
state continues to play an important role. It regulates and monitors the operation
of the management companies, and guarantees "solidarity in the base" through a
minimum pension.
All individuals employed in the formal sector are required by law to participate
in the funded social-security system. They have to contribute, to the AFPs of
their choice, 10 per cent of their wages. These funds are invested by the AFP
and are accumulated on an individual retirement account. Participants can
switch management funds up to 4 times a year. There is an additional contribu-
tion of roughly 3 per cent of wages as a premium for term life and disability in-
surance. Both of these contributions are subject to an upper limit wage base,which is currently equivalent to approximately 2 000 US$ per month. Self-
employed workers are not required to participate in the system. They have the
choice, however, to set up individual retirement accounts of their own which
are basically subject to the same regulations as those of the formal-sector em-
ployees.
The Chilean pension reform has successfully replaced an inefficient, unfair, in-
solvent pay-as-you-go system with a reasonably well-functioning privately
managed system. Up to now the rates of return of the new system, as well as the
pensions being paid out have been rather high. This trend, however, is likely to
decline in the years to come, as Chile's rates of return begin to converge to-
wards world-market levels. An interesting issue seems to be how the system
will react to this new state of affairs. It is not unlikely, then, that the Chilean
system will continue to evolve providing us with fresh lessons in the future. Re-
forms of the basic reforms are already on their way. The main issue in this re-
spect is how to reduce the cost of administration of the AFPs. It is expected that
these reforms will result in a decline in costs of administration which seem to
have become increasingly out of hand.
4. Lessons from Australia and Chile
It is hard to draw lessons from too short an experience. Social security is a
matter of (four or more) decades. At this time one might venture to conclude
that in both countries, firstly, funded social-security systems have proven to be
more efficient than the formerly existing pay-as-you-go system. Secondly, the
experiences in Australia and in Chile demonstrate that a radical change away
from pay-as-you-go systems can be efficient. Furthermore, the experiences of
these two countries reveal that such a reform requires a strong political deter-
mination. It also shows that it is not sufficient to make only changes on the
margin. Thirdly, the example of Chile shows that administrative misconceptionscan endanger the whole system. High costs through manipulations (of sales
agents who pass "their" clients from one fund to another, just for reasons of
commissions) can, however, easily be avoided.
All in all: If a change towards a funded social-security system is to be intro-
duced, the change must be a radical one. All people must be convinced that this
change will be irreversible. What remains unconvincing in both countries' ex-
periences, is, however, the relationship between the new system and the still
existing safety net of government-provided minimum pensions. And in the case
of both countries, it has to be noted that these reforms have essentially only
dealt with the old-age provisions for employees in the so-called formal sector.
The question is, then, how to deal with social security regarding those people
who are not engaged in a kind of formal employment An important lesson from
these experiences is, however, that a change towards a funded system can be
performed under rules that acknowledge claims accumulated under the previous
pay-as-you-go system.
B. Basics of a Funded System and Its Variations
1. Prolegomena
The funded system of social security is intended to substitute, in Germany, the
existing government pension system (GPS)
3; it is not meant as a substitute for
corporate or other private-pension schemes. It should be added that the existing
German GPS has neither defined contributions (because the rate of contribution
is determined politically on a short-run basis) nor has it defined benefits in the
Feldstein-sense (because pensions are also determined politically on a short-run
basis). The reason for this undefined situation is that in this kind of pay-as-you-
go system revenues and expenses must be balanced in the short run, and the
Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung (GRV).10
way to achieve that end is a continuous meddling with contribution rates, pen-
sion levels, number of pensioners, number of contributors, and so on. If you
want to go one step further back in the chain of causality, the political manoeu-
vring is a consequence of the vulnerability of the GPS regarding exogenous in-
fluences such as changes in the age structure of population, business cycles, and
the desire to redistribute incomes (Glismann, Horn 1997).
The main quality of a funded social-security system is individual retirement ac-
counts (Feldstein 1996). Everyone participating in the system hands (part of)
his savings over to a financial intermediary; this assures him of his property
and, under normal circumstances, of positive returns on his savings accounts.
Important to note that these contracts with financial intermediaries do not in-
clude any kind of insurance, be it insurance of life, or disability. The institu-
tions in charge of handling savings and the institutions in charge of handling in-
surances are - at least theoretically - fundamentally different; the first one is
dealing with transforming individual savings into non-individual capital accu-
mulation, the second one is dealing with transforming individual risks into av-
erage risks.
4
It has been shown that the existing mandatory and unfunded GPS in Germany is
economically inefficient when compared with the working of the capital mar-
ket. For example, in order to achieve average pension levels of 1995, as pro-
vided by the current system, contributions could have been about 40 per cent of
what they actually have been (Glismann, Horn 1995). To put it differently, a
42-year old employee who paid 1 000 DM to the GPS would have achieved a
pension at the age of 65 for which he would have had to pay only 337 DM on
the capital market (Glismann, Horn 1997). This price differential, just like any
4 De facto financial markets often provide a combination of saving and insurance activities.
The product mix may help the intermediaries to make profits; it is nonetheless a combination
of two seperate products.administered price differential, leads to deadweight losses. The deadweight
losses arise not only on the market for social security but there are also addi-
tional static losses on the labour market and dynamic losses due to deficient
growth rates in the long run (caused by deficient overall savings). A mere abol-
ishment of GPS would make employees depend on the (more efficient) funded
systems. The transformation towards such a system should not be too difficult
since funded pension schemes do already exist - at the corporate level - in all
countries, even in Germany. Let us first analyse how such a funded system
would work, and then look into slightly modified private systems. The modifi-
cation will pertain to making the whole system, or part of it, mandatory.
2. A Funded System of Social Security
A purely funded system of social security raises three problems:
5
- Not everybody who was formerly contributing into GPS can be expected to
contribute voluntarily into a funded system.
- What provisions do we need, if any, to allocate these private savings?
- Can contributors rely on such a funded system? In other words: Would the
system impose additional risks on contributors when compared with the gov-
ernment GPS?
As regards the first point, the main reason for a mandatory regulation has been
that there are always some people who do not care about saving for their old
age. The problem is aggravated in most industrial countries because these pro-
vide welfare payments to those people who are in dire need due to the fact that
5 We are not concerned here with problems of transition from unfunded to funded systems.
Our focus is the funded system in being. With respect to the transformation process, quite
obviously everybody who has accumulated pension claims should be rewarded adequatly.
But again, this is a matter of transformation.12
they cannot or will not earn (enough) money by working. The mandatory so-
cial-security contributions have thus always been aimed at minimizing the
moral hazard involved.
We are dealing with a hen-and-egg problem here: Are the incentives to pay vol-
untarily into private-pension systems too weak because of the availability of
welfare payments? Or do we need welfare payments because of the weak in-
centives to pay into funded pension systems? Anyway, there is reason and sta-
tistical background to believe that the majority of people are ready to care for
their old age themselves instead of relying on welfare payments. There are sev-
eral reasons for that assumption: Firstly, in spite of existing GPS and private-
pension schemes, most people have accumulated additional and huge amounts
of private wealth, in the form of bank accounts, houses, financial assets, etc.
Secondly, welfare payments that constitute a large part of the moral-hazard
problem are only paid after the recipient has proven that he has no personal
wealth left and has no close relatives to support him. Thirdly, every past con-
tributor into GPS will in a funded system have about 20 per cent (in Germany)
of his gross income available for other purposes than GPS. It can be assumed
that the ordinary citizen would be quite ready to pay at least 40 per cent of this
additional income into a pension system that would put him on equal terms re-
garding his future pension levels. All in all it seems to be a safe assumption that
the number of welfare recipients would not increase by such a transition.
As regards the rules for allocating private funds on the capital market, at first
sight there is a multitude of confusing possibilities where each individual's
money could go. But this is confusing only at first sight. Taking the past for a
reference, the allocation of private savings in Germany has been, to say the
least, conservative. Adding to this conservatism the fact that the additional
savings in private-pension funds would be considered long-run investments, it
can be surmised that the conservative standard portfolio decision in Germanybs Instifuts fur Weltwirfsch@ft ,-,
would become even more conservative. In other words: The share of gamblers
regarding pension funds can be expected to be close to zero. Quite different
from this problem is the fact that returns on savings are as different across
banks as they are different across financial assets. In this case preferences play
a major role. But even if the returns on assets is different across contributors,
there is no a priori reason why it should not be. As a matter of fact, since banks
or other financial intermediaries function as advisors, there may come about a
tendency of the rates of interests to converge across different investments.
The final point is concerned with the safety of private pension funds. There are
two aspects to this problem: Firstly, it may be argued that the safety of invest-
ments will be quite low regarding the still existing alternative (unfunded GPS):
Studies have shown that the real rates of return of GPS contributions in Ger-
many will be negative over the next decades (Glismann, Horn 1997; Eiten-
muller 1996; Ohsmann, Stolz 1997). In other words: The contributions to GPS
will be unsafe according to the already existing law, not to speak of the almost
daily introduced worsening of future input/output relationships of GPS. Sec-
ondly, it is often argued that only the government can guarantee the safety of
accumulated social-security contributions. It is hard to see, however, why gov-
ernments cannot guarantee social-security contributions which are paid into
private pension funds, especially as many a major crisis, such as world wars or
world depressions, or extremely high rates of inflation, have the governments'
policies for the principle cause.
As far as institutional arrangements are concerned a funded system of social se-
curity would not need introductory institutional support by the government. If
there would be a lack of financial intermediaries, it does not require a lot of
imagination to forecast a rise in the number of institutions.14
3. A Fully Mandatory Funded System of Social Security
It is often argued that the difference between a totally or partially mandatory
funded system is only one of scale. Therefore it would suffice to just look at a
fully mandatory funded system which provides the same level of pensions that
the GPS did. Assuming for the moment that such a system works as efficient as
the capital market, the rate of contribution in Germany could decline from some
20 per cent to some 8,per cent of the individual gross income. There are, how-
a^ver^problems'to-besolved, some of them referring to economic philosophy,
some to the institutional setting.
As to the first: What is the economic rationale for a fully mandatory funded
system? It cannot be the moral-hazard problem (which says that some people
are unwilling or unable to contribute) because in order to account for that a
partially mandatory system - which provides for some basic income only -
would suffice. Indeed, there does not seem to exist any valid philosophy sub-
stantiating a fully mandatory funded system.
As to the institutional setting of a fully mandatory funded system the case
seems to be more complicated than the one of a fully (i.e. private and volun-
tary) funded system:
(1) Who assesses the mandatory rate of contribution? It is hard to describe a
mandatory system that is not controlled by society, i.e. by the government.
(2) How are the mandatory funds to be allocated? Since the individual contribu-
tor has a priori a multitude of financial opportunities, and corresponding to
that a multitude of expected rates of return, it must be ensured that the de-
gree of speculation or simple gambling is effectively restrained. Therefore,
laws are necessary that provide for a reasonable policy of allocating the fi-
nancial resources (portfolio selection).15
(3) The regulations have to define eligible financial intermediaries. With re-
spect to these intermediaries the German law is actually quite restrictive at
present regarding investment funds and, for example, life insurances.
(4) A fully mandatory funded system cannot leave the time of exit, i.e. of re-
tirements, to the individual contributor: The idea of a mandatory system is
to ensure that every retiree has a minimum of financial means. If we deal
with the real world as it is, we must consider the problem of sore losers. A
mandatory system where some people are better off because they can exit
earlier and/or at a higher pension causes envy with the neighbour who is
forced to contribute for a longer time at a probably lower rate of return on
top. Thus, a mandatory system should aim at forcing contributors to stay in
work for a defined period of time.
(5) It is hard to envisage that such a system would leave a retiree the free dis-
posal of his accumulated funds. This would contradict the inherent aim to
ensure a certain amount of income to the elderly people over the rest of
their lives.
(6) With respect to the possibility of bequeathing the not consumed part of the
accumulated savings, there does not seem to be a major difference to a vol-
untary private funded system.
All in all, the fully mandatory funded system has, as points (1) to (5) show,
very much in common with the existing mandatory pay-as-you-go system. It
can be doubted whether such a mandatory funded system will work as effi-
ciently as the capital market. The reason is that the government has to come up
with almost as many regulations as in a PAYGO system. Thus, the rate of con-
tribution would not be the above mentioned 8 per cent which the capital market
would require; it would be higher, in the worst case as in the PAYGO system.16
probably approaching the rate of that system. Correspondingly, the rates of re-
turn could also be negative over the next decades.
4. A Partially Mandatory Funded System
The main question here is whether a partially mandatory system has the same
properties that a fully mandatory system has. In other words: Is the degree of
coercion just a matter of scale, or are there additional discriminating factors
between the two systems? Assuming that moral hazard is again the core argu-
ment for keeping the system mandatory, the contributions should in this case
only provide for incomes at a subsistence level. Any contributions beyond
could be left to the individual non-mandatory private arrangements. From this it
follows that the most appropriate regulation would be a per-capita contribution
- or more exactly: a poll-tax - which would not discriminate in any way among
citizens. Thus, we should look at a two-tier system which provides for a basic
social-security level, financed by a poll-tax, and a non-mandatory funded sys-
tem where everybody can contribute according to his own preferences.
The institutions that seem to be necessary in such a two-tier system are the fol-
lowing:
(1) The non-mandatory part of the funded system would not need any specific
regulations.
(2) The mandatory part of the system would be governed, by and large, by the
same institutional provisions that have been outlined above for the fully
mandatory system.
(3) In order to minimize the costs of bureaucracy it may be worthwhile to think
about letting the revenue-offices be responsible to collect the poll-tax. A
law could then make the office deliver the revenue from this tax to private
financial intermediaries. The contributions of the individual citizens would17
still be earmarked, so that the revenue-office is compelled to hand over the
revenues to the intermediary according to the preference of the individual
tax payer. Both the fully mandatory and the partially mandatory systems
have one thing in common: Contributors are not free to retire at their own
will. Additionally, contributors are not free to allocate the mandatory part of
the funds at their will. As a matter of fact, anybody who retires early will
have nonetheless to pay into the mandatory part of the system for as long as
every other citizen. In other words, he will have to secure a pension-level
through the funded part of the system that is well above the level that would
have been necessary in a fully funded system. All in all, it can be assumed
that the future rate of return on total contributions into the system will be on
average higher than in a PAYGO system or any other fully mandatory sys-
tem. It will be lower than in a fully funded system. Thus, measured by the
outcome, it is not just a factor of scale that makes the partially mandatory
system different from the fully mandatory system.
C. Scenarios for Organizing Social Security in Germany
1. Overview
The number of scenarios for reforming the German system of social security
6 or
for changing it seem to abound. Most of all, there are studies contemplating the
implications of funded systems and of tax-financed systems of redistribution. In
the following we shall discuss two alternative mixed systems of the above de-
scribed "Partially-Mandatory-Funded-System" type, which both should be su-
perior in terms of economic efficiency. Efficiency means, firstly, that there
6 It has been shown that the current system of social security in Germany is not a Iruc
PAYGO system because of the dominating role of policy interventions, regarding both con-
tributions and benefits. We described the present system to be a "Discretionary Serial-
Security System" (cf. Glismann, Horn 1997).18
should be a positive real rate of interest on savings or contributions, if not a
market interest rate; secondly, the system should be free from short-run inter-
ventions by governments or parliaments in order to make possible rational ex-
pectations of each citizen regarding his retirement income. Thirdly, the system
should avoid more efficiently the dependency of social security on exogenous
factors existing today, such as the development of the structure of population,
or economic developments (unemployment or real rates of overall economic
growth).
2. Two Multi-Tier Scenarios
a. A Three-Tier System: Welfare Payments cum B4* cum B2*
The logic behind this three-tier system is that there are some old people (aged
65 or more) who had not paid (enough) contributions into the social-security
system and have therefore to rely on welfare payments. It is important to note
that with welfare payments the individual wealth and other incomes of the re-
cipients as well as incomes of his closest relatives are taken into account before
granting welfare payments. In other words: Recipients must first consume their
personal wealth and must then rely on being supported by close relatives. Any-
way, this is the way the present welfare payment system in Germany actually
works. It ensures at the same time that the incentives for the employed people
and the tax payers to accumulate savings for their old age are not too much
distorted.
The second tier of this scenario would be a mandatory funded system which en-
sures every contributor of a minimum income in his old days. The level of this
income is politically determined; one might argue that the level should be
higher than the welfare payments of the first tier. In order not to make the level
B2 and B4 refer to the disposition in the table of contents.19
of this basic income as well as the contributions to this basic income a matter of
endless political interference, the level of basic incomes should be guaranteed
by the constitution; the constitution should, for obvious reasons, at the same
time make this basic income for the old people tax exempted. Since this part of
the system is to be funded, there should be no redistributions involved; all con-
tributors should pay the same amount for the second tier. The second tier is thus
a system of defined contributions and undefined benefits, the latter being sub-
ject to the allocation of savings and to the market rate of interest. Of course, as
opposed to the welfare payments, personal wealth as well as incomes of close
relatives are of no account. Every contributor gets an individual account with a
financial intermediary of his own choice.
A fully funded system would be the third tier. Contributions as well as expected
benefits are left to the individual. There are no compulsory payments. This part
of the system works completely through the capital market. Therefore this is the
only one of the three tiers can be considered efficient.
b. A Two-Tier System: Basic Incomes cum B2
Another possibility of constructing social security in a relatively efficient way
is to abolish welfare payments for the old people. Instead, the suggestion of
Miegel and others is picked up, according to which every old person, no matter
whether insured or not, no matter whether a tax-payer or a contributor into any
old-age system and independent from individual wealth and incomes, receives a
basic income starting at the age of 65 (Miegel, Wahl 1985). This basic income
will be defined as a percentage of the current nominal national income per cap-
ita. In order to avoid the meddling of politicians and parliaments with the basic
income level for the old, this level should be guaranteed by the constitution; the
constitution should also provide for tax-exemptions at the same level in the in-
come-tax schedule. One may define the basic income as a brazen subsistence20
level not to be touched upon by government. The basic income will be financed
through taxes; individual wealth and other incomes and incomes of relatives
will not matter. The main argument that has been put forward against such a
basic income system for the old has been that such a system distorts incentives
and makes the average citizen lazy. It is interesting to note that the argument
comes mainly from fellow travellers of the current GPS; nonetheless, of course,
it is a major and economically feasible argument. However, the citizen that
serves as a model here is one that is content with having a low level of income,
with having the same income as all the other old people, that has no special de-
sires and no special incentives to increase his own well-being. In other words,
the model citizen seems to be the citizen who would rely on welfare payments
rather than have command of his own life. Experience tells us that such a citi-
zen represents not the average but is rather a rare exception. Besides that, the
current GPS-system which provides no incentives at all to do anything beyond
paying the current mandatory contributions does not prevent the average citizen
from saving and investing. The main question rather seems to be, whether such
a basic income system will not be too expensive for the tax payer, since all the
old people, without exception, receive the specified income. This is an empiri-
cal question (see below).
The second tier of this scenario is the above mentioned fully funded system. All
things that have been said above apply here.
c. Some Empirical Observations
In the following we shall be dealing with future developments. In order to keep
the content of personal opinion in the forecast as low as possible, the statistics
presented rely mainly on forecasts of the German Statistical Office, Wiesbaden
(with respect to the population statistics), and they rely on the forecasts of
Prognos AG (regarding the social-security system up to the year 2040).21
In Table 1 the number of clients receiving welfare payments has been calcula-
ted by assuming that the share of welfare recipients aged 65 and older in total
population will not change over the next 50 years. The only variable that chan-
ges is gross population. Table 1 shows that the number of welfare recipients in-
creases over the next 45 years by a good 50 per cent.
7 The mandatory part is
only concerned with those who actually paid contributions into the GPS.
With respect to the number of clients of the funded pensions in scenario I the
number of welfare recipients in each year has been subtracted from the number
of clients regarding the mandatory part of providing basic incomes. It is thereby
assumed that the number of people who are unwilling or unable to be part of
GPS is equal the number of people who are part of GPS but have no desire or
no ability to care for an additional voluntary private saving for old age.
It is also assumed that the absolute amount of health insurance is the same for
all people that are 65 and older. For example, every welfare recipient will - in
addi-tion to the maximum of welfare payments (1 204 DM) - be ascribed
296 DM, which is to cover health insurance (paid by the government). This
amount is independent from past "performance" and from gender.
8
The results regarding scenario 1 are shown in Table 1. All in all. total yearly
social-security expenditures in 1995 would have amounted to 319 Bill.DM.
7 Regarding the future development of population in Germany (he lirst of Ihrcc variants
calculated by the Statistical Office has been taken. This is the variant with the lowest rate of
net immigration. The reason for doing this is that the rate of unemployment is high regarding
immigrants and thus the share of those who contribute to the social-security system is low.
Since we operate in Tables 1 and 2 with constant shares of welfare recipients as well as of
tax payers and contributors into the social-security system, the first variant would prevent
us to be overly optimistic regarding contributions and revenues.
8 The same amount was paid by the "typical" member of the GPS in 1995; in this latter case
the recipient of a basic income pays only 50 per cent of the total health-care contribution,
the other part is paid by the GPS institution (as regards the 296 DM: this is the amount of
money paid into the health insurance by an average employee who has worked 45 years and
has contributed in every year the average yearly contribution of all members).Table 1 - The Statistics of Scenario 1: A Ballpark Estimate (at prices of 1995)
Tier
1. Welfare Payments
2. Basic Incomes (manda-
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a Share of contributors to GPS in the population between 15 and 65 years, multiplied by the number of people aged 65 and more. -
 b Excluding those
people who were not part of GPS. -
 c Guesstimate (cf. Text). -
 d Maximum amount, including health insurance (paid by government; cf. text); wealth
and incomes of close relatives would effect a reduction in welfare payments. -
 e Assessed Growth Rate: 2,1 % (upper variant of Eckerle et al.).
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 7/94. - Eckerle et al. 1995. - Own calculations.23
This is by and large what was paid out by the GPS system in 1995. However, it
must be remembered that in the first tier the number of clients is only 15 per
cent of total welfare recipients, which indicates that some 85 per cent of wel-
fare recipients are of an age below 65 years. Similar reasoning applies to the
second tier (basic incomes), where only 38 per cent of GPS recipients are in-
cluded (due to the fact that the total number of recipients is bluned by people
who receive more than just one pension and by the fact that the average con-
tributor retires at the age of 59/60 years). All in all, total yearly social-security
expenditures in scenario 1 would be a little more than 9 per cent in 1995; this
share in GDP will increase over the next 45 years to a level of 14 per cent of
GDP. For comparison: Prognos forecasts a share of GPS of about 22 per cent in
the year 2040 (Eckerle et al., p. 9)
In scenario 2, as has been discussed above, there do not exist any welfare pay-
ments to people aged 65 and older; instead the basic income system applies to
all. Quite evidently, the total burden to the tax payer is much greater than in
scenario 1, due to the fact that everybody receives a tax-financed basic income
once he is 65 or older. The voluntary part of scenario 2 is somewhat higher than
in scenario 1 because the number of clients is greater (including civil servants
and part of the self-employed farmers). All in all, the total burden is higher than
in scenario 1 in every year considered. It has to be remembered that the burden
can be easily adjusted to any level by just scaling down the level of basic in-
comes.
3. Economic Implications of the Two Scenarios
It is certainly true that any quantitative assessment of the effects of the two
scenarios described above can only be precisely wrong; however, they can cer-
tainly be vaguely right. In other words, one can be quite certain that the directi-






5. As % of GDP
a Assessed Growth Rate: 1

















.,1 % (upper variant of Eckerle et al.).









































Source: Cf. Table 1; Sources as in Table 1. - Own calculations.25
existing GPS system, can be correctly assessed. The exact amount of changes in
the social product, in the rate of growth, or in investment and employment are
probably even less precise than the ball-park estimates of the scenarios in Table
1 and Table 2.
The macroeconomic effects of the two scenarios are shown in Table 3. The sy-
stem of reference is the existing one in 1995, which is a combination of GPS.
government officials' pensions, farmers' pensions, welfare payments and many
more of other governmental schemes. We concentrate on the effects on savings,
investments, employment and growth. It is assumed that there is no disequili-
brium regarding savings and investments, we take account of the existing dise-
quilibrium on the labour market (9.4 per cent rate of unemployment). With re-
spect to scenario 1, the assumptions are the following: The additional savings
consist of contributions to the purely funded part and of 60 per cent of the con-
tributions to the basic-incomes part. The reason for the latter is that although
the system is based on the capital market, it is nonetheless mandatory. We sug-
gest that the mandatory part is less efficient than the voluntary part and therefo-
re only take 60 per cent of the contributions to be additional savings. As regards
scenario 2, considering the above discussion, we suggest that all contributions
to the funded system are net additions to savings.
Table 3 - Macroeconomic Effects of Scenarios 1 and 2 in Germany
- A Model for the Base Year 1995 -
Indicator
1. Savings = Investment (Bill.DM)
a
2. GDP (capital productivity: 0.25; Bill.DM)
a
3. Employment (1 000) max.
min.
4. GDP-Growth
a (% per annum)




























Source: Tables 1 and 2. - Heitger (1997). - Own calculations.26
Since both scenarios have in common the funded part of each system, the
change from GPS to this funded system incorporates a change from a transfer
system to a savings/investment system. In other words, the yearly amount of
voluntary savings that will be channelled through the capital markets will in-
crease by an amount that can be calculated from superannuated contributions
based on the pension levels shown for tiers 2 and 3 in Table 1, and for tier 2 in
Table 2. Insofar it could be argued that total private savings would increase in
scenario 1 by 379 Bill.DM and in scenario 2 by 61 Bill.DM in the base year
1995 (Table 3).
Two final remarks seem to be necessary:
In both scenarios the former contributors to the GPS would no longer have to
contribute; the net effect of additional taxes and cessation of contributions will
leave a considerable net-income increase to the former GPS-members. It can be
assumed that some people will spend the major part of their net savings for
contributing into a funded social-security scheme.
9
- With respect to scenario 2 a large part of expenditures for the old people is
already paid from taxes at present. Among the beneficiaries are government
officials, welfare recipients, and old farmers; additionally, the tax support to
the GPS has to be mentioned. Our best guess would be that by and large
9 There are balancing effects with respect to savings as well. The voluntary savings in scena-
rio 2 will probably not increase total savings of the economy by the same amount. This is
due to the fact that the basic income in scenario 2 will guarantee the level of subsistence also
for all those people who have never been part of the GPS. It can be surmised that the sa-
vings of this group of people, that hitherto had been done for their old age, will decrease. In
addition, all those contributors that are married will receive under the basic income system
of scenario 2 a household-income - once they both will have reached the age of 65 - that
will probably be significantly higher than their GPS-income would have been (this holds at
least for a large part of those marriages where only part was contributing, or where the con-
tributions of the other one were significantly below those of the main contributor). This
group of people will also cut their savings. The negative effect on total savings is aggravated
by the change in the tax structure: The two groups that will cut their savings will have to
pay additional taxes in order to finance the basic income-system.27
150 Bill.DM are of this kind. Again looking at Table 2, the marginal raise in
taxes for financing a basic-income system is only one third of the figures
shown in the columns of total security expenditures. The adjusted total se-
curity expenditures would then be some 8 per cent of GDP instead of the
12.3 per cent as shown in Table 2 for the year of 1995.
D. Should Contributions be Taxed, or Benefits, or Both?
Without going deeply into the theory of public finance it can be said that a tax
system should try not to tax economic growth more than absolutely necessary.
In addition, taxes should not discriminate more than necessary among activities.
and costs of administration should be kept as low as possible. Considering this,
there are two basic options regarding taxation in a funded social-security sys-
tem:
- The accumulation of capital as well as interests paid on that capital remain
untaxed until the period of accumulation is over and pensions are paid to re-
tirees. Again, there are two possibilities of taxation:
• The total accumulated capital stock is subject to an indemnity tax (which
is raised but once). From then on pensions will not be burdened again by
income taxes. A minor problem arises here because after taxation by the
indemnity tax further interest payments will accrue the remaining capital
stock. This problem can be effectively dealt with by fixing the rate of the
indemnity tax appropriately.
• The pensions are taxed on a current basis according to the income-tax
schedules. The administrative problem that arises in this case is that the
retiree must be prevented from transferring part of his social-security
capital to other locations and thereby prevent current income taxes by ar-
tificially reducing his pension level. Similar problems arise in all those28
cases where the retiree dies relatively early. In that case there exists the
possibility that the remaining capital stock will not be "adequately" taxed.
- All savings for social security stem from after-tax incomes. From this it
would follow that future repayments in the form of pensions would be totally
tax-free. Only interests on the capital stock are subject to income taxation. In
order to keep the system simple, it can be argued that interest payments
should not be taxed until the end of the period of accumulation, i.e. until re-
tirement. Then we have the same situation with respect to returns to capital
that was discussed in the previous case.
The main result regarding a funded social-security system would be that in both
cases an indemnity tax should be superior with respect to keeping the costs of
administration low and the whole system simple.
With respect to the two scenarios presented above, things are a bit more com-
plicated because the funded system is only part of each scenario. In the first
scenario the welfare payments for the old people are by definition tax-free; the
welfare payments are financed by taxes. As regards the second tier of scenario
1, the mandatory absolute payments for old age, this is meant to secure a certain
level of subsistence. It can be argued that all contributions, since they are the
same for everybody, as well as the returns on the savings and the pensions paid
for retirees should be tax-free. As to the third tier: see above.
There are no fundamentally different tax implications regarding scenario 2. The
tax-financed basic income is by definition to be kept tax-free, just like the wel-
fare payments of scenario 1. The funded part of the system was discussed
above.29
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